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Abstract
This article looks at the UK Labour Party’s view of the EU single market over the last four
decades, focussing on three case study periods when this issue was particularly salient: first,
the time of the single market’s introduction under Neil Kinnock’s leadership; second, the A8
accession with Tony Blair as Labour Prime Minister; and third, between the 2016 European
referendum and 2019 general election during Jeremy Corbyn’s time as party leader. This his-
torical narrative uses the theoretical approach of Harvard economist Dani Rodrik—of a ‘tri-
lemma’ faced by national policy makers in response to globalisation—as a lens to describe a
clear arc in Labour’s policy towards the single market across the three case studies. A posi-
tion of initial scepticism moved to support under Kinnock’s leadership, and then active
encouragement under Blair, before coming back again under Corbyn to uncomfortable non-
commitment. This arc directly correlates with the ebb and flow of the party’s overall eco-
nomic approach—first the Keynesian, national Alternative Economic Strategy at the time of
the party’s 1983 general election defeat; then, the deviation under Blair to a policy that
actively encouraged cross-border market liberalisation; and finally the return to an Alterna-
tive Economic Strategy-style approach under Corbyn.
Keywords: Labour Party, European Union, single market, Neil Kinnock, Tony Blair, Jeremy
Corbyn
Introduction
SINCE THE 2016 EU referendum, the Labour
Party’s view of the single market has been a
significant part of its overall intentions for
the UK’s future economic relationship with
Europe. The policy outlined in Labour’s 2019
election manifesto—a first preference for
‘close alignment with the Single Market’
which can ‘support UK businesses’, but not
the direct advocacy of remaining in the EU
or European Economic Area—was not
formed without internal disagreement.1 In
June 2017, Jeremy Corbyn lost three Shadow
ministers after they and forty-six back-
benchers within the ‘Labour Campaign for
the Single Market’ group rebelled against a
three-line whip, and instead called for mar-
ket membership. Polling the same year sug-
gested eight out of ten Labour members felt
the same way.2
We should not be surprised that the single
market has caused such disagreement within
Labour. The ‘four freedoms’ the market
guarantees—of capital, labour, goods and
services across EU member states—make
prominent, different points of view within
the party on related policy issues. These
include immigration, the role of the state in
the national economy, and the degree to
which government should work with or
against international flows of capital.
Labour’s disastrous 2019 election cam-
paign is in the rear-view mirror, and the UK
is heading for Brexit on Boris Johnson’s
terms. Before the coronavirus pandemic and
Sir Keir Starmer’s election as Corbyn’s suc-
cessor, the party leadership had called for a
‘period of reflection’. One would expect that
an important area for Labour’s re-evaluation
of its EU policy will be its view of the UK’s
relationship to the customs union and single
market. An historical narrative of Labour’s
changing policy towards the single market
can provide four decades’ worth of useful
context in this upcoming intra-party debate.
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Accordingly, this article looks at three case
studies of single market policy under three
different Labour leaders—Neil Kinnock,
Tony Blair and Jeremy Corbyn.
Using Dani Rodrik’s ‘trilemma’ of
globalisation
Across the three case studies, this article
uses a theoretical framework from Har-
vard economist Dani Rodrik, who writes
of a ‘trilemma’ faced by national policy
makers when they seek to respond to
globalisation. He says that in the modern
world, these decision makers are faced
with a choice between the three points of
this trilemma: increasing economic interde-
pendence with other states (‘economic
globalisation’); maintaining national control
of economic policy (‘national sovereignty’);
and maintaining the ability to reflect the
domestic public’s policy preferences
(‘democratic legitimacy’). He argues they
have a choice of any two, but not all at
once.3 It is therefore a question of select-
ing a combination. As Andrew Gamble
neatly summarises:
In the first combination—economic interde-
pendence and national sovereignty—authori-
tarian governments use their power to
pursue economic interdependence and sacri-
fice democracy.
Rodrik’s second combination—economic
interdependence and democratic legitimacy
—is when national sovereignty and nation-
states wither away to be replaced by cos-
mopolitan government.
In the third combination—national sover-
eignty and democratic legitimacy—govern-
ments stay close to the wishes and interests
of their citizens, and take steps to limit or
even reverse economic interdependence.4
Although this trilemma is not undisputed
among authors and academics, it is used
consistently here because it provides a useful
frame to think about the ebbs and flows of
Labour’s policy towards the single market
over time. It does so primarily because the
three points of the trilemma align with intra-
Labour splits that are seen across all three
case studies: between those who assign more
importance to economic interdependence
(‘economic globalisation’), or in more public
accountability in the economy (‘democratic
legitimacy’), or in ensuring national control
over economic policy (‘national sover-
eignty’). In short, the trilemma is a parsimo-
nious mechanism which makes the
complicated ideological composition of the
Labour Party more accessible.
In summary
This article finds that across each of the three
case studies, Labour has sought to ensure
that, with respect to the EU’s single market,
national sovereignty—that is, national pow-
ers over economic policy exercised by elites
—has remained a consistent priority. What
has changed across the time period is the
other point of the ‘trilemma’ with which it
has been paired. In the period from Kinnock
to Blair, Labour shifted its single market pol-
icy from a position that prioritised national
sovereignty and democracy (over globalisa-
tion) to one that prioritised economic globali-
sation and national sovereignty (over
democracy). With Corbyn, we saw move-
ment back in the other direction. As set out
below, this arc of Labour’s single market
policy correlates with the ebb and flow of its
overall economic strategy during the same
period.
Case study 1: embracing the




On assuming the Labour leadership in
September 1983 after a heavy general elec-
tion defeat the same year, Neil Kinnock
inherited a party whose policy was that ‘the
European Economic Community . . . was
never designed to suit us’.5 It was one of the
first things the new regime changed: Charles
Clarke, Kinnock’s chief of staff, recounts that
after the 1983 election, ‘the earliest [policy
issue] that was dealt with was EU member-
ship’.6 Party conference votes in 1988 and
1989 eventually formalised Labour’s shift to
a pro-European position.
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Labour took longer to move on economic
strategy than it did on Europe. Kinnock may
have accepted that ‘Britain obviously
remains a capitalist country with a society
that is competitive without being merito-
cratic’, but in the years immediately follow-
ing 1983, the spirit of Labour’s reflationary
‘Alternative Economic Strategy’ (AES) lived
on.7 The AES—described by Tony Benn as
‘the most radical programme the party has
prepared since 1945’—espoused Rodrik’s
combination of national sovereignty and
democratic legitimacy. Comprised of refla-
tion, public ownership, industrial democracy,
economic planning, alongside price and
import controls, it mixed both national fiscal
stimulus and democratisation of the
economy.
Even after the 1983 election, this sort of
economic agenda remained in fashion
among the party leadership: Kinnock’s eco-
nomic advisor, John Eatwell, still believed
that his job remained to ‘create a framework
in which we can pursue Keynesian policies
in a credible way as part of the overall pro-
ject of an industrial policy’. Nor was French
President Francois Mitterrand’s failed
attempt at ‘socialism in one country’ in the
early 1980s a reason to change course. Eat-
well says the lesson of Mitterrand’s dirigisme
was that it instead showed ‘the danger of
doing macroeconomics alone’.8
The issue was that an interventionist, ‘so-
cialism in one country’ type of economic pol-
icy as contained within the AES could not
easily be reconciled with Labour’s increasing
support for Britain’s EEC membership, and
the greater economic interdependence mem-
bership would bring. Common Market rules
prevented state use of exchange controls to
support the competitiveness of domestic
manufacturing; and although Kinnock may
have been leading the party to a pro-
European position, he nonetheless criticised
other EEC states’ ‘hostility to the use of [ex-
change] controls . . . which is now professed
by those very countries which used such
controls to launch their own industrial suc-
cess stories’.9 He felt European colleagues
should be doing more to drive up employ-
ment: it was ‘nothing short of outrageous, at
a time when there are 15 million unem-
ployed in the Common Market, that the
leaders of Western Europe . . . still not
produce a single proposal for the economic
expansion which our country of Britain and
our continent of Europe so desperately
need’.10
To reconcile EC membership with Keyne-
sianism and the pursuit of full employment as
the ‘guiding aim of [a Labour] government[‘s]
policy’—and in effect, to maintain democratic
legitimacy while EC membership threatened
greater economic globalisation—Kinnock
called for coordinated, cross-border reflation
across European states. An idea given the
name ‘EuroKeynesianism’, this can be traced
back to Stuart Holland MP, a former advisor
to Harold Wilson and left-wing Shadow eco-
nomic minister in the late 1980s.11 In line with
the EuroKeynesian agenda, Kinnock’s 1986
book Making Our Way sets out how such ‘an
employment strategy for Europe is desperately
needed’: what was required was coordinated
fiscal expansion, recognition of different prob-
lems that individual countries faced, as well as
‘clear rules of operation, so that gains and sac-
rifices are fairly distributed’ across the EC.12
Labour’s coming to terms with Britain’s
inclusion in the EC meant the party did not
disapprove outright of the European Com-
mission’s proposal for a single market when
it was announced as part of the 1986 Single
European Act (SEA).13 Eatwell has since sta-
ted that the various common standards
agencies produced to support the market
were ‘rather liked’ by the party; and on sup-
ply chains, ‘the idea that this was a way of
[Britain] again getting back into making
commercial aircraft, my God this was won-
derful!’14 But on the other hand, nor was it
clear that the market could work for
EuroKeynesian ends. As a result, while the
SEA was being negotiated, Labour’s Europe
spokesperson, George Robertson, said the
plans for a single market were ‘wholly irrele-
vant’, and nothing more than ‘institutional
tinkering’ that would not ‘inspire confidence
among the 4 million unemployed in this
country, never mind the 10 million others
out of work across the Community’.15
1987—a turning point for economic
strategy
Although Labour had been moving in a
pro-European direction since 1983, it was
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not until after the 1987 election loss that the
party deviated from a purely Keynesian
economic approach, to allow greater room
for economic globalisation. The need for
greater public control of industry and the
economy was stressed by Labour’s spokes-
people, rather than public ownership out-
right. Private enterprise was talked about
more favourably—the party accepted that
‘modern government has a strategic role
not to replace the market but to ensure that
the market works properly’.16 A wide inter-
nal coalition supported this shift: even
Michael Meacher, who had stood against
Roy Hattersley as the Labour left’s
candidate to be deputy leader in 1983, came
to the view by 1987 that ‘there was no
socialist objection to the technical concep-
tion of a market’, and that the ‘taboo’ over
the market should be ‘exorcised once and
for all’.17
The single market was the nexus at
which Labour’s turn to Europe and accep-
tance of greater economic globalisation after
1987 intersected. It became an important
priority. Speaking in early 1988, Kinnock
said ‘unemployment, north-south relations,
the conservation and development of the
environment, technological and scientific
cooperation . . . The development of the so-
called single European market by 1992
places these issues at the top of the British
political agenda’.18 As before the 1987 poll,
Labour still felt ‘the internal market would
be a disaster’ without a positive agenda to
accompany the market liberalisation—but
by the end of the 1980s the party was will-
ing to find positive, European, solutions to
potential problems the single market could
create.19 The Labour leader set out in April
1988 that ‘our non-engagement would mean
the unimpeded movement to the complete
economic and political domination of Wes-
tern Europe by market power . . . Leaving
the European field to that is no more
acceptable than leaving Britain to perma-
nent Thatcherism’.20
The ‘social dimension’ as a remedy for
single market membership
Although Kinnock accepted more economic
globalisation through the single market, the
way in which Labour sought to mitigate its
negative effects—in partnership with
European colleagues—was through cam-
paigning for cross-border social and envi-
ronmental policies. At the same time, they
lobbied for measures that would ensure the
delivery of such policies, in particular quali-
fied majority voting and the removal of
member states’ veto power. There was a
political motive for Labour to do so: Gallup
polling at the time showed 55 per cent of
British people saw membership of the EC
as a ‘good thing’; and while Margaret
Thatcher was openly hostile to this sort of
European legislation, as Kinnock later
recalled, Labour could use this ‘social
dimension’ to position itself as the ‘better
Europeans’.21
The speech of European Commission Pres-
ident, Jacques Delors, at the TUC’s 1988 con-
ference in Bournemouth, is often pointed to
as the turning point when Labour began its
positive engagement with the ‘Social Europe’
agenda. In an address covered by the UK’s
major television networks in prime time,
Delors described the single market pro-
gramme as a ‘peaceful revolution in which
we all must participate’ and said the accom-
panying ‘social dimension’ would be its ‘vi-
tal element’.22 This was certainly an
important call to action—Charles Clarke says
it ‘was a completely decisive moment in
terms of the British labour movement and
the European question in general’—yet the
ideas expressed by Delors were already on
Labour’s radar.23 Kinnock had already said
publicly in April that year that alongside the
single market, action was needed to prevent
‘neglect or abuse of the environment’, along-
side enhanced workers’ rights and protec-
tions for retired people.24 The chronology
tells us instead that, as Eatwell recounts, it
was more the case that Delors gave Labour a
push at the right time:
Kinnock wanted to change the policy
towards a more pro-European stance, and
Delors came along and . . . made it easier. So,
it wasn’t that Delors fired it off, then the
trade unions came along, then the party
changed the position. I think there was a
combination of things happening, that were
deemed at the time to be fortuitous, happen-
ing at the same time.25
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Regardless of who initially instigated
Labour’s change of tack, the commitment
to implementing a ‘Social Programme . . .
to ensure the benefits of the unified market
are shared by all people in the EC’—not
only for the ‘benefit [of] the business com-
munity’—was established by members’ vote
at the October 1988 party conference.26 By
the 1992 election, Labour had committed to
opt in to the new Social Chapter—claiming
that by doing so, it would ‘promote Britain
out of the European second division into
which our country has been relegated by
the Tories’ and ensure . . . so that the Bri-
tish people can benefit from European safe-
guards’ and ‘poorer countries are not
disadvantaged as a result of the Single
Market’.27
In committing to this policy in its 1992
manifesto, Labour sealed the transformation
of both its European and economic strategies
that took place over the duration of Kin-
nock’s leadership: euroscepticism had turned
to acceptance, at the very least, of EC mem-
bership; the selection of Rodrik’s combina-
tion of national sovereignty and democratic
legitimacy had increasingly become a prefer-
ence for that of national sovereignty and eco-
nomic globalisation.
Case study 2: Tony Blair,
globalisation and the A8 accession
Britain’s most pro-European Prime
Minister?
It is often said about New Labour’s foreign
policy that Tony Blair was ‘the most instinc-
tively pro-European Prime Minister since
Ted Heath’.28 Blair himself has not shied
away from this image, whether through his
public advocacy of a second Brexit referen-
dum, or in his memoirs and speeches, where
he has said that throughout the 1980s he
‘helped change our policy . . . [and] was
proud of that change’, because ‘I believe in
Europe as a political project’.29 In govern-
ment, this rhetoric was accompanied by
action: Labour MPs from the time com-
mented that ‘we were totally isolated [in
Europe] under the Conservatives . . . now we
are seen as a team player, much more
involved’.30
Globalisation as ‘irreversible and
irresistible’
New Labour’s desire to communicate and
demonstrate economic responsibility has—it
will not surprise the reader to note—been
fiercely debated for at least two decades. It
was nonetheless a key focus of the party’s
pitch to voters. The 1997 manifesto commit-
ted Labour to be ‘wise spenders, not big
spenders. We will work in partnership with
the private sector to achieve our goals . . .
because efficiency and value for money are
central, ministers will be required to save
before they spend’.31
During Kinnock’s leadership, particularly
after the 1987 election, Labour increasingly
came to support cross-border economic glob-
alisation. The effect of Blair’s ‘modernisation’
was to take this support to a new level. As
the Prime Minister told the 1998 World
Trade Organisation conference, globalisation
was not only welcomed; it was ‘irreversible
and irresistible’.32 He added at the 2005
Labour conference: ‘I hear people say we
have to stop and debate globalisation. You
might as well debate whether autumn
should follow summer’.33
Financial liberalisation—previously criti-
cised within the party as the ‘relentless pur-
suit of profits for the minority’—now
became an important priority.34 Blair’s EU
advisor, Roger Liddle, would later recall
that ‘we gave a big push to’ financial liber-
alisation in Europe, and ‘we tried to avoid’
cross-border regulation of financial ser-
vices.35 Support for this sort of economic
globalisation marks a clear divergence from
previous pillars of Labour economic strat-
egy, notably public ownership—and there-
fore democratic legitimacy. One Labour MP
was reported at the time to have said that
after 1992 ‘the party was pretty well willing
to give Blair a blank cheque and saying
“win us power, we’re fed up with being
battered, get us back to power”. And he
delivered’.36
As an active advocate of both the EU and
cross-border economic liberalisation, Blair
sought to capture the benefits of the free
flow of capital, goods, services and people
within the single market to achieve British
and social democratic interests. For the
Prime Minister, it was to be celebrated that
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Britain had ‘enjoyed rising prosperity based
on open markets and fair competition’
between European partners.37 Liddle recalls
that the ‘City of London becoming the finan-
cial capital of the single market . . . was very
good’ because of the ‘investment in public
services that was facilitated’. With economic
growth, ‘the Labour government then dis-
tributed [its benefits] in a fair way. And that
was the political economy under which New
Labour operated’.38
Even support for the Social Chapter,
hailed by Kinnock as a game-changing
accompaniment to the single market, was
constrained where it rubbed up against com-
peting demands of European economic inter-
dependence. Although Blair signed the
Chapter within the first week of his adminis-
tration in 1997, once it became law he told
fellow EU leaders that he would guard
against several future European Directives
because ‘I don’t believe there is any appetite
in the rest of Europe to have great rafts of
additional legislation’ of this sort.39 Liddle
says this was about keeping business on
side: Blair felt that if his government went
any further than accepting policies such as
the national minimum wage, new laws on
trade union recognition and the Working
Time Directive, ‘we would be endangering
our relationship with business. And that was
pretty fundamental to his and Gordon’s poli-
tics’.
The A8 enlargement with zero-year
transitional controls—a political move
with economic benefits
The Blair government’s strong support for
the EU single market was expressed clearly
in its decision not to impose seven-year
transitional controls on migration from eight
former communist states (the ‘A8’) at the
time of the EU’s 2004 enlargement. While
enlargement had been a consistent British
foreign policy goal since Margaret Thatcher’s
time in office, key actors in Blair’s adminis-
tration talk primarily about a political
motive. Sir Stephen Wall, Permanent Repre-
sentative to the EU in Blair’s first term, said
at the time that ‘the primary argument was
the political one—this was the right thing to
do’.40 Charles Clarke, Home Secretary
between 2004 and 2007, says this was politi-
cally permissible at home because ‘in 2004
immigration was not a major issue . . . this
issue of so-called Polish plumbers then got
built up following that’.41 The PM was even
prepared to endure a £1 billion cut in the
British rebate each year to secure the A8’s
entry.42
Support for this enlargement may have
primarily been political, but the decision not
to impose seven-year transitional controls on
entrants from the A8 was nonetheless in line
with New Labour’s prioritisation of eco-
nomic globalisation, and British macroeco-
nomic strategy of the preceding decade. As
Gamble describes, these encouraged the
export of services, especially financial ser-
vices, alongside flexible labour markets that
supported the development of a low wage
economy and the recruitment of large num-
bers of migrant workers.43 The Blair govern-
ment knew the value of migration into the
UK in this overall economic picture, includ-
ing through the EU single market. As immi-
gration minister, Barbara Roche, told an
audience in the City of London in 2000,
while ‘we crack down where necessary on
misuse, we must not lose sight of the bigger
picture . . . the evidence shows that economi-
cally-driven migration can bring substantial
overall benefits both for growth and the
economy’.44 In a 2005 White Paper, the gov-
ernment stated ‘we would be poorer in every
way without [immigrants] . . . visitors from
outside the EU spend over £6 billion a year’
in the UK, while ‘those from within the EU
billions more’.45
Politically ‘managing’ immigration
while maintaining support for the free
movement of labour
The reader will note that the resulting
increase in migration from Eastern Europe
after 2004 became much politicised. A gov-
ernment survey of public attitudes under-
taken in 2013 found that 77 per cent of
British people wanted immigration to be
reduced, with 56 per cent saying this reduc-
tion should be by ‘a lot’.46 Using Rodrik’s
terms, one could suggest that Labour
responded by pivoting towards democratic
legitimacy: the government introduced
6 J O S H CO L E
© 2020 The Author. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC)
The Political Quarterly
measures intended to mitigate immigration’s
political salience, and to reassure the public
that it was being controlled. Clarke recalls
that soon after the A8 accession, ‘Tony and I
decided it was the single most important
thing for us to address going into . . . the
2005 election’. Accordingly, Clarke says that
the government’s 2005 White Paper on this
topic set out ‘a strategy for dealing with
migration’: it comprised a points-based sys-
tem and a process which defined ‘who is
entitled to come’ alongside criteria for
migrants entering the UK, and how they
were to be ‘properly enforced’.47
However, the Labour government’s com-
mitment to free movement of labour
through the single market—reflecting its pri-
oritisation of economic globalisation—meant
that, in practice, it would only go so far to
limit arrivals from A8 states. The gains from
interdependence were valued above the
increasing salience of immigration—as Blair
stressed during the 2005 election campaign,
‘we have nothing to fear from legal immi-
gration, and the issue is whether we are
attracting as many of the highest value
immigrants as we can’.48 Liddle recounts
that ‘as long as we were basically commit-
ted to a liberalised labour market [vis-a-vis
the EU]—what the left would call neoliberal
—we weren’t going to be able to introduce
special measures that applied to immi-
grants’.49 Jacqui Smith, a minister in several
departments and Clarke’s successor as
Home Secretary, recalls the reasoning: ‘I can
remember seeing Treasury papers that said
if we limit migration we will reduce our
[economic] growth’.50
This is not to say domestic politics was
never a factor. Indeed, the government took
the opportunity to impose seven-year transi-
tional controls when Bulgaria and Romania
joined the EU in 2007. But rather than signif-
icant policy change, government communica-
tions were an important remedy after the
initial A8 accession. This strategy was essen-
tially to change the subject: the Prime Minis-
ter reportedly instructed colleagues: ‘Don’t
mention the advantages of immigration in
public’.51 Rupert Murdoch and his media
empire are often identified as a key domestic
audience. As close advisor Liddle concedes,
‘I do think [Blair and Brown] were scared of
The Sun’.52
Case study 3: Returning to
‘socialism in one country’ under
Jeremy Corbyn
A Remain membership, a eurosceptic
leadership
While Labour had consistently been pro-Euro-
pean since Kinnock’s era, historically Jeremy
Corbyn’s personal opinions about the UK’s
EU membership have not aligned with that of
the majority in his party. As a trade union and
Labour activist, he voted for Britain to leave
the EEC in 1975.53 During his successful 2015
leadership campaign, he said he ‘wouldn’t
rule out’ campaigning for Leave.54 A record of
eurosceptic instinct is shared within Corbyn’s
inner circle: a senior former member of the
Shadow Cabinet adds ‘there are those around
the leadership who have very, very strong
views, who are themselves committed Lexi-
teers. One can’t ignore that fact’.55
The Labour Party’s europhilia, and Cor-
byn’s personal euroscepticism, were rolled
together into a ‘Remain and Reform’ compro-
mise pitch to voters during the 2016 referen-
dum. This allowed room for the leader to
express his long-held concerns over Britain’s
EU membership. In his first speech of the
campaign, Corbyn said that the UK should
remain in the EU ‘warts and all’.56 With only
a few weeks to go until polling day he said on
Channel 4, at prime time, that his passion for
EU membership was ‘seven, or seven-and-a-
half’ out of ten.57 Accounts of several party
officials recount how ‘by and large the Lea-
der’s Office never turned up’ to campaign
meetings.58 Harry Burns, a Labour regional
director during the referendum and head of
elections for the 2017 general election, adds
that the leader’s office cut key pro-European
lines out of speeches, and the man himself
instead preferred to talk to crowds of support-
ers about domestic issues such as homeless-
ness and austerity.59
Leaving the single market—less about
free movement of labour for Corbyn,
more about capital
Since the vote to leave the EU in June 2016,
Labour has not officially supported a
UK LA B O U R AN D T H E EU S I N G L E MA R K E T 7
© 2020 The Author. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC)
The Political Quarterly
Remain stance as first priority, nor the UK’s
continued single market membership. At the
2017 general election, the party’s manifesto
included a vague pledge to ‘accept the refer-
endum result’ and ‘put the national interest
first’, while prioritising ‘jobs and living stan-
dards, build[ing] a close new relationship
with the EU’ and ‘protect[ing] workers’
rights and environment standards’.60 As
agreed by a members’ vote at the 2019
party conference, the policy for the most
recent election remained ‘close alignment
with the Single Market’, but not Britain’s
inclusion.61
While some, such as Gareth Evans and
Anand Menon, saw this nuanced policy as
‘Brexit blurrism’, others see it as the product
of domestic politics.62 Former Shadow For-
eign Secretary, Hilary Benn, in seeking to
maintain a coalition of both Leave and
Remain voters sufficient to win a general
election, noted that ‘the party leadership had
been thinking, “How do we straddle those
two positions?”, which is not an unworthy
objective in itself’.63
As it walked that tightrope to try and
retain both Leave and Remain support, for
over a year after the 2016 referendum the
Labour leadership pointed to one of the sin-
gle market’s ‘four freedoms’—the free move-
ment of labour—to justify why it could not
support the UK’s staying within the single
market. In his first public statement after the
vote, Corbyn said ‘it’s clear . . . immigration
is a crucial issue for a lot of people, and
played a central role in the EU referendum
campaign’.64 Shadow International Trade
Secretary, Barry Gardiner, wrote in July
2017 that Labour should not support staying
in the European Economic Area, because
‘Brexit arose from key political, rather than
trade, objectives: to have control over our
borders, to have sovereignty over our
laws’.65
Having identified public concerns about
immigration, one might therefore assume
that Labour’s policy to leave the single mar-
ket was proposed as a direct response, con-
sistent with the ‘democratic legitimacy’
element of Rodrik’s trilemma. Indeed, a
member of Corbyn’s staff told Politico in
September 2016 that Labour supported ‘ac-
cess’ to the single market for goods and ser-
vices after Brexit, rather than full
membership because—referring to the mar-
ket’s ‘four freedoms’—‘there are aspects of
that which Jeremy campaigned against in
the referendum campaign’.66
However, it is not the case that Corbyn
personally opposed the free movement of
labour, nor sought to take the UK out of the
single market on this basis alone. Instead,
there is much evidence to show he has been
a consistent supporter. For instance, once
Cameron’s renegotiated deal with the EU
was announced in April 2016, the Labour
leader came out against the ‘emergency
brake’ on benefits to EU citizens that the
Prime Minister had secured—what Hilary
Benn would call ‘electoral suicide’, since
Labour voters were perceived to be most
affected by wage pressures from immigra-
tion.67 During the referendum campaign
Corbyn talked about how free movement of
labour had ‘created opportunities for British
people’ living on the continent.68 Referring
to EU migration during the 2019 campaign,
he said he had ‘made my case very clear
about the value of migration to our society,
about the stability of people living in our
society’.69 Former Labour official, Harry
Burns, says ‘Jeremy genuinely really believed
that the only good thing about Europe was
freedom of movement [for labour]’.70 This is
not to say Corbyn was a minority in his
party for supporting this particular aspect of
economic globalisation: at Labour’s 2019
party conference members voted to ‘main-
tain and extend free movement rights’
within the EU after Brexit.71
Rather than the free movement of labour,
Corbyn’s personal opposition to other areas
of European economic globalisation—the free
movement of capital, and the EU’s institu-
tional controls on national state aid—better
justify the party leader’s preference for leav-
ing the single market after Brexit. He was
consistent on this point, both before and
after the 2016 referendum. In his first speech
of the campaign, Corbyn called for changes
in EU legislation that pressures governments
‘to deregulate or privatise public services’;
shortly before polling day he said the type
of free movement which most concerned
him was ‘free movement of money abroad
to dodge the taxes that fund our public ser-
vices, [and] the free movement of our coun-
try’s wealth and corporate profits into tax
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havens’.72 In September 2016, he said ‘there
are directives and obligations linked to the
single market, such as state aid rules and
requirements to liberalise and privatise pub-
lic services, which we would not want to see
as part of a post-Brexit relationship’.73 In
2018, he added ‘I don’t want to be told by
somebody else that we can’t use state aid in
order to be able to develop industry in this
country’.74
Kinnock and Blair had increasingly come
to accept and favour economic interdepen-
dence in Europe through the single market’s
‘four freedoms’. But Corbyn’s unusual pref-
erence for some (not all) of these freedoms—
a liberal immigration policy, but a position
outside of EU state aid requirements and the
free movement of capital—shows how he
sought to adopt features consistent with both
Rodrik’s combinations of national sover-
eignty with economic globalisation, and
national sovereignty with democratic legiti-
macy. In mixing parts of these two combina-
tions, Corbyn selected an economic strategy
which appeared neither to enjoy public sup-
port—a YouGov poll before the 2019 election
showed 63 per cent thought Labour’s eco-
nomic policies undeliverable—nor was in the
best position to reap the full benefits of glob-
alisation.
Corbyn’s ‘Bennite’ economic strategy
Corbyn’s incorporation of greater democratic
legitimacy into economic policy stems from
his decades-old advocacy of ‘Bennite’ eco-
nomics. Named after his friend and political
mentor, Tony Benn, this was the basis of the
AES that preceded Kinnock’s tenure—the
agenda for reflation, public ownership and
economic planning described above.
Over three decades after the AES, now as
Labour’s leader, Corbyn looked to shift the
party back in its direction. Speaking six
months after the Brexit vote, the Labour lea-
der said his main priority was to ‘borrow to
invest . . . at historically low interest rates . . .
to generate far greater returns’ and increase
employment.75 The 2017 and 2019 general
election manifestos included nationally-led,
reflationary policies in the style of the 1983
blueprint: examples include a £500 billion
National Investment Bank alongside an
accompanying network of regional banks,
and the bringing of ‘rail, mail, water and
energy into public ownership to end the
great privatisation rip-off’.76 Using Rodrik’s
terms directly, Jonathan Rutherford—a mem-
ber of the independent inquiry into why
Labour lost in 2017—says the combination of
prioritising national sovereignty and demo-
cratic legitimacy was ‘implicit in Labour’s
2017 manifesto. The trade-off is the market
economy and it is the option favoured by
Labour’s eurosceptic hard-left faction, whose
policies of increasing nationalised ownership
offer a form of state socialism in one
country’.77
Conclusion
This narrative, covering key moments in
Labour’s policy towards the EU single mar-
ket over the past four decades, has described
a clear arc. The party’s initial scepticism
towards the market became support during
Kinnock’s leadership, and then active
encouragement under Blair, before returning
again with Corbyn to uncomfortable non-
commitment.
This path complements the shift of
Labour’s economic policy over the same per-
iod. Starting with the AES’s focus on invest-
ment in national production and
manufacturing, over the tenures of Kinnock
and Blair, Labour accepted—and then
embraced—the role of the market in the Bri-
tish economy, while at the same time it
sought to harness the tax dividends of
greater economic liberalisation to fund more
public services. Under Corbyn we saw this
trend reversed.
This arc of Labour’s single market policy
is formed by different calculations each
Labour leader made in response to Dani
Rodrik’s ‘trilemma’—the forced choice
between national sovereignty, democratic
legitimacy and economic globalisation. While
across the three case studies each leader has
prioritised national sovereignty—taken to
mean national power over economic policy
exercised by elites—what has changed has
been the other point in the trilemma with
which it has been paired. First, during Kin-
nock’s leadership, the benefits of economic
globalisation became increasingly valued
over democratic legitimacy, as the party
eventually moved to accept less public
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ownership in the domestic economy. At the
apex of the arc, Blair made a clearer and
more consistent selection in favour of eco-
nomic globalisation, as financial liberalisation
was embraced and cross-border ‘Social Eur-
ope’ legislation limited where it could
impact economic growth. Finally, in pursu-
ing a ‘Bennite’ economic strategy, Corbyn
paid more attention than his predecessors to
democratic legitimacy, at a cost to economic
globalisation. But he supported some of the
‘four freedoms’ more than others, champi-
oning the free movement of labour, while
denouncing the free movement of capital.
By thinking about the history of Labour’s
approach to the EU single market in terms
of Rodrik’s trilemma—of trade-offs between
combinations of economic globalisation,
national sovereignty and democratic legiti-
macy—it is easier to understand the calcula-
tion that the party will need to make when
taking future policy decisions on this issue;
and which point of the ‘trilemma’ would be
sacrificed for a move in a certain direction.
This can only be helpful during the debates
to come within Labour about what it wants
the UK’s post-Brexit relationship with the
EU to look like.
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